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Abstract 
The objectives of cyberattacks are becoming sophisticated, and attackers are concealing their 
identity by masquerading as other attackers. Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is gaining 
attention as a way to collect meaningful knowledge to better understand the intention of an 
attacker and eventually predict future attacks. A systemic threat analysis based on data 
acquired from actual cyber incidents is a useful approach to generating intelligence for such 
an objective. Developing an analysis technique requires a high volume and fine quality data. 
However, researchers can become discouraged by an inaccessibility to data because 
organizations rarely release their data to the research community. Owing to a data 
inaccessibility issue, academic research tends to be biased toward techniques that develope 
steps of the CTI process other than analysis and production.  
In this paper, we propose an automated dataset generation system called CTIMiner. The 
system collects threat data from publicly available security reports and malware repositories. 
The data are stored in a structured format. We released the source codes and dataset to the 
public, including approximately 640,000 records from 612 security reports published from 
January 2008 to June 2019. In addition, we present a statistical feature of the dataset and 
techniques that can be developed using it. Moreover, we demonstrate an application example 
of the dataset that analyzes the correlation and characteristics of an incident. We believe our 
dataset will promote collaborative research on threat analysis for the generation of CTI. 
1. Introduction 
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is evidence-based knowledge including context, mechanisms, 
indicators, implications, and actionable advice regarding existing or emerging threats to 
assets [1]. CTI can be utilized to achieve a broad situational awareness, collaborate in 
defeating cyber threats faced by others, and prevent cyber threats by applying CTI into 
defense systems. 
 
With an increase in global cyber threats, CTI is gaining increased attention as a response to 
such threats. Many nations and organizations have also attempted to promote the use of CTI 
by enacting laws that legalize and encourage the collection of CTI [2], sharing CTI through 
multilateral cooperation [3-5], and establishing various standards [6, 7]. Furthermore, during 
the recent decade, the number of articles related to CTI have dramatically increased, as 
shown in Figure 11. 
 
1 Google Scholar search result with exact keyword matching of ‘cyber threat intelligence’ including patents and 
citations on March 30, 2019. 
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During the Olympic Winter Games in PyeongChang 2018, a cyberattack targeting the server 
operated by the organizing committee occurred. What makes this case noteworthy is that the 
security researchers attributed different countries as the perpetrators of the attack. The 
authors in [4] and [8] insisted that Chinese and Russian actors were responsible for the attack, 
respectively. In [9] and [10], it was pointed out that it is impossible to attribute the attack to a 
specific country based on the small amount of code discovered, which overlaps malware used 
by the Lazarus Group, a hacking group from North Korea. However, the authors of [4] 
insisted that there was evidence indicating that a Russian attacker tried to masquerade as a 
North Korean hacking group. In this example, we can see that a precise evidence-based 
analysis that considers all possibly related cases is vitally important for CTI generation. 
 
However, among the traditional intelligence processes [11], i.e., planning and direction, 
collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and 
integration, most technical studies on CTI have tended to focus on steps other than analysis 
and production, which require a real CTI dataset. Despite the many advantages of a CTI 
analysis as mentioned in [12], such as 1) an interoperability of the data (machine, vendor, and 
organization independent), 2) a compact expression of the heterogeneous source of the threat 
information, and 3) the possibility of conducting a long-term and nation-wide threat analysis, 
we believe that the most challenging aspect of such a study is the limited accessibility of data 
to researchers. Although some web services provide functionality when searching for threat 
data, they do not offer a sufficient and useful set of data for research purposes. In addition, 
most of the datasets consist of only specific data types, e.g., the IP, URL, or hash value, and 
some datasets are strictly restricted to access in certain regions or to people of a particular 
nationality. 
 
In this paper, we propose a cyber threat dataset generation system called CTIMiner, which 
automatically collects data from public security reports and malware repository websites and 
stores the data in a structured format. The generated dataset contains several types of data 
including malware analysis information, which consists of the file path, mutex, code sign 
information, and the other data types listed above. The main contributions of our work are as 
follows: 
 
• Promoting collaborative CTI analysis research by proposing a cyber threat data 
generation system and a public database 
• Demonstrating the use of the dataset for a correlation analysis 
• Suggesting the development of techniques to generate CTI from a dataset 
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Figure 1: Number of articles related to CTI within the most recent decade 
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At this point, it would be warranted to introduce the techniques used to generate CTI from a 
dataset. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper and remains as our future research 
concern. We believe that the suggestion of the required techniques for analyzing the dataset 
can inspire the researchers and promote research into CTI analysis. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The intelligence process and its 
associations with CTI activities are presented in section 2 with several studies related to each 
step. The overall system architecture of CTIMiner and the phases composing the run-time 
process are described in section 3. The dataset structure, the data categories, and the 
statistical features are detailed in section 4. In section 5, the dataset usage is demonstrated, 
and analysis techniques are suggested. Following an introduction of the source code and 
dataset access in section 6, we provide some concluding remarks in section 7. 
2. Related Works 
2.1. Intelligence Process and Automated CTI Activities 
In the field of military operation, the well-defined intelligence process illustrated in Figure 2 
was adapted to efficiently generate intelligence from low-level data collected in the field to 
support the decision-making process. This process is intended to be followed by a human 
intelligence officer but can also be projected into automated CTI activities. 
 
 
Figure 2: Intelligence cycle defined during military operation [11] 
 
Once the operation direction is determined to fulfill the identified intelligence requirement, 
the raw data are collected and extracted from the sensors and data sources, which have the 
ability and functionality to obtain such data. The data gathered from these various sources are 
combined and converted into forms, in other words information, allowing the data to be 
efficiently analyzed. The information is passed into an analysis algorithm, such as a big data 
or machine learning based method, which enables the intelligence collected to be used by 
human analysts. Such intelligence is then spread to others who have access to it. The shared 
intelligence can also be integrated into the intelligence already available to users. 
 
The association between the intelligence process and automated CTI activities is illustrated in 
Figure 3. In the following subsections, previous studies regarding CTI are introduced in order 
of the applied intelligence process, excluding the planning and direction steps because these 
are more strategic, rather than technical, concerns. 
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2.2. Collection 
Because CTI is also a product of threat data processing through the intelligence process, low-
level threat data can be collected during this step. Goel classified the types of data to be 
collected into unstructured and network data [13]. The former typically consists of hacker 
forum postings, blogs, and websites, whereas the latter is generated from information security 
systems such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and honeynets. 
 
Benjamin et al. proposed a method for extracting information from hacker forums, IRC 
channels, and carding shops to identify threats [14]. In addition, Fachkha and Debbabi 
characterized the darknet and compared several methods for extracting threat information 
there [15]. 
 
As a data repository for research regarding cyber security analysis, the Information 
Marketplace for Policy and Analysis of Cyber-risk & Trust (IMPACT) [16], which is based 
on Protected Repository for the Defense of Infrastructure Against Cyber Threats (PREDICT)  
[17], provides several types of data, such as network flow, IDS and firewall, and unsolicited 
email data. It also provides useful tools for data analysis. However, the service is only 
available to DHS-approved countries, namely, the United States, Australia, Canada, Israel, 
Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. 
2.3. Processing and Exploitation 
During the processing and exploitation step, raw data collected are converted into forms that 
can be readily applied by intelligence analysts and other users. Unstructured data and 
heterogeneous sources of data having different structures can be stored in a unified data 
format during this step for further analysis.  
 
STIX [18] and OpenIOC [19] proposed by MITRE and MANDIANT are representative 
standards for expressing threat data. Specifically, STIX is widely used owing to the 
scalability of its schema, which uses components such as CybOX, and CAPEC. Liao et al. 
proposed an element extraction method for constructing structured data from unstructured 
data [20]. One notable aspect of this approach is that the meaning of the elements in the 
context can also be retrieved using a natural language processing technique. 
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Figure 3: Association between the intelligence process and automated CTI activities 
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2.4. Analysis and Production 
During the analysis and production step, all processed information is integrated, evaluated, 
analyzed, and interpreted to produce intelligence. Kornmaier and Jaouën insisted that, to 
generate operational or strategic intelligence beyond tactical information, which is technical 
in nature, the threat data should be fused with data collected from different disciplines such 
as Human Based Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signal Intelligence 
(SIGINT), and Geographic Intelligence (GeoINT) [21]. 
 
Modi et al. proposed an automated threat data fusing system that correlates data crawled from 
the web by applying a string-matching based approach [22]. Similar commercial CTI services 
have also been developed, such as iDefense® IntelGraph by Verisign and a web intelligence 
engine by Recorded Future that allows users to navigate through extensive threat data 
following a string-matching correlation. One key feature of Recorded Future is that it can 
conduct a predictive analysis of specific future events through the use of information 
compiled in advance [23]. However, commercial services provide an indicator-centric 
analysis approach making it difficult to trace the correlation between incidents. 
Kim et al. proposed a general framework for an efficient CTI correlation analysis by adopting 
a novel concept that expresses similarity between threat events in a graphical structure [12]. 
A graphical structure allows the analysts to trace the specifications and transition of related 
cyber incidents to infer an attacker’s intention. 
 
Using a threat report as the source of information, Qamar et al. proposed an automated 
mechanism to analyze the risk of a reported threat toward a networked system [24]. For this 
purpose, they defined the ontology of the IoCs, network, associated risk, and their relations. 
For the risk analysis of a networked system, four parameters, namely, the threat relevance, 
threat likelihood, total loss of affected assets, and threat reachability, are defined. 
2.5. Dissemination and Integration 
During the dissemination and integration step, intelligence is delivered to and used by the 
consumer. A guideline [25] and technical standard protocol [26] have been developed for 
sharing CTI. In addition, MISP [27], MANTIS [28], and CIF [29] are useful open-source 
platforms to store and share CTI. 
 
As more participants in a community share CTI, access control issues with the shared data 
often arise. Zhao and White proposed an access control model that extends the group-centric 
Secure Information Sharing model to support collaborative information sharing in a 
community [30]. Although such assistive technologies promote CTI sharing, for example, 
social and political issues, the authority to operate CTI sharing policies and the trust 
management within a community are often controversial when establishing collaborative CTI 
sharing. 
2.6. Data, Information, and Intelligence 
In many CTI-related studies, the terms, data, information, and intelligence, are often 
intermixed without clarification. We need to use them clearly, as illustrated in Figure 4, based 
on the definition in [11]. 
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Figure 4: Data, information, and intelligence 
 
Data are the individual facts collected from sensors in an operational environment. 
Information is data gathered and processed into an intelligible form, and intelligence is the 
new understanding of current and past information that allows a prediction of the future and 
informed decisions. 
 
These definitions are applied not only to the general intelligence process but also to CTI 
activities. Throughout the data fusion and mining process, Bass defined data as 
measurements and observations; information as data placed in context, indexed, and 
organized; and knowledge, which is equal to intelligence, as information that has been 
explained or understood [30]. 
3. CTIMiner System Architecture 
We propose a cyber threat data collecting system, CTIMiner, using the system architecture 
presented in Figure 5. The CTI collecting procedure is composed of three phases. During the 
first phase, the system gathers threat data from publicly accessible cyber intelligence reports 
published by organizations and companies. It also collects additional related data from a 
malware repository during the second phase. Finally, all collected data are stored in the 
database after passing through the last phase generating combined information in a structured 
format. 
 
 
Public Security(APT) Reports
Malware hashes
Malware 
repository
Malware analysis data
parse IoCs
has analysis 
result?
no
Malware hash
yes
(  Hashes, Mutex, Filemapping, codesign, IP, URL ...)
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[ Phase 1: Parsing IoC ]
[ Phase 2: Collecting analysis data ]
[ Phase 3: Data filtering & Storage ]
Figure 5: CTIMiner system architecture 
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3.1. Phase 1: Parsing Indicators of Compromise 
This phase starts with collecting cyber intelligence reports that analyze cyber incidents and 
malware interrelated APT campaigns and groups. For this, we obtain a list of papers from 
public repositories2 that provide publicly available articles and blog content related to 
malicious attacks, activities, and software associated with vendor-defined APT groups and/or 
tool sets. To maintain the usability of the dataset, we exclude the periodically published 
threat analysis reports from a list integrating the analysis results from different APT groups 
that have no interrelation with each other. Therefore, it can be assumed that the data extracted 
during phases 1 and 2 are related to the same (or related) threat actors. We can use this 
property to set the ground truth of the data for analysis. This property and the dataset 
usability are explained in detail in sections 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
Next, Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) are extracted from the reports using a parser. We 
utilize a modified ioc_parser3 that extracts IoCs matched by predefined regular expressions 
such as the URL, host, IP address, e-mail account, hashes (MD5, SHA1, and SHA256), 
common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE), registry, file names ending with specific 
extensions, and the program database (PDB) path. Among the data obtained, the malware 
hash values are passed to the second phase for further data collection, and other values are 
passed to the last phase. 
 
The IoC extraction performance is critically influenced by the performance of the parser. 
Therefore, other parsers can be chosen to increase the performance of this phase. 
 3.2. Phase 2: Collecting Analysis Data 
Owing to the functional limitation of a parser, there may be remaining IoCs not extracted 
from the reports that can be found in malware analysis data. Moreover, we can obtain 
additional data from the analysis results that are not in the content of the reports. Notably, the 
valuable data, which cannot be expressed as a regular expression such as mutex, file 
mapping, code sign, and other strings, are only collectible from the malware analysis results. 
 
To collect the malware analysis data, we use the malware repository service, malwares.com, 
operated by Saint Security Inc., the first cloud-based malware analysis platform in South 
Korea. It possesses over 800 million malware samples and maintains a partnership with 
VirusTotal. If the malware analysis results are retrieved by querying the hash value, the data 
in the results, namely, hashes, URLs, IP addresses, PDB paths, code signs, file names, and 
other strings, are passed to the last phase; otherwise, the hash value itself is passed. We do 
not store malware samples in the database because of the possible occurrence of copyright 
concerns when it is publicly released. For the new hash values found from the results, the 
analysis data are gathered through the same procedure. 
3.3. Phase 3: Data Filtering and Storage 
The data collected from several sources may be redundant or noisy and can be filtered out 
during this phase. For example, some files are automatically generated by the operating 
system regardless of the intent of the malware creator when the malware is executed. We 
 
2 APTnotes (https://github.com/aptnotes/data) 
   APT & CyberCriminal Campaign Collection (https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections) 
3 https://github.com/armbues/ioc_parser 
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merge the repetitive data and remove noisy data during this phase. However, the trade-off 
between false-positives and false-negatives needs to be considered for noise removal. The 
filtered data are stored in the MISP server, which provides an API to manage and export data 
in various structured formats. 
 
Optionally, we categorize the data types composing the dataset and analyze their statistical 
characteristics during this phase, the results of which are presented in the next section. 
3.4. System Processing Results of Phases 1 and 2 
We ran this system on 612 collected APT reports published from January 2008 to June 2019, 
the numerical processing results of which are in Table 1. Among the 14,313 malware hashes 
extracted from the reports, we obtained analysis results for 68.1% of them from the malware 
repository. Among the analysis information, we found 450 new malware hashes that were not 
contained in the APT reports and added the analysis information to the dataset. The value of 
including the malware analysis data, in addition to the IoCs extracted from the reports, is 
described in the statistical analysis of the dataset provided in section 4.2. 
 
Table 1: Processing results of phases 1 and 2  
Types No. % 
No. of reports 612 - 
No. of data stored in the dataset 642,810 - 
No. of extracted malware hashes from the reports 14,313 - 
No. of analyzed malware 9,753 68.1 
No. of additionally extracted malware 450 4.6 
 
4. Dataset Descriptions 
4.1. Dataset Structure and Data Types 
The dataset is composed of several sets of events, and Figure 6 shows the relationship of one 
set of events, which is composed of two types of events, namely, one report event and several 
malware events. A report event includes the data extracted from the first phase described in 
section 3, which parsed the texture IoCs from the APT reports. Malware events are created 
whenever malware hashes are detected, and it is possible to obtain their analyzed data during 
phase 2. These malware events and report events from which the malware hashes are 
originated can be grouped under the title of the report. 
 
Figure 6: Relationship of a set of events 
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The data schema of an event is presented in Figure 7, and a short example of a set of events is 
shown in Figure 8. Because all malware events originating from one report include the same 
file name of the report, this can be used as the ground truth of the correlation analysis of the 
data. In addition, the malware compilation dates and the publication dates of the reports can 
be useful for a temporal analysis of the dataset. A sample application of the dataset for a 
correlation analysis using these dataset characteristics is demonstrated in section 5. 
 
 
 
The types of attributes stored in a dataset are the IP, URL, e-mail address, date and time, 
CVE, file name, PDB path, digital code sign serial number, and other string data, including 
the author and title of the document. The amount of data, the report, and the malware events 
are shown in Table 2. Using the source codes that we publicly released, a dataset composed 
of the attribute types of interest can be created. 
Figure 7: Data schema of an event 
Figure 8: Example of a set of events 
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Table 2: Number of data for each type 
 
 
Year 
Data Types 
Report Malware 
Hash IP URL e-mail date, time CVE file name PDB code sign others total 
2008 0 3 171 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 191 2 0 
2009 2 7 84 2 0 0 10 0 0 0 105 2 0 
2010 223 79 280 14 32 2 213 0 0 0 800 7 32 
2011 1,440 412 478 17 319 7 713 2 38 25 3,340 14 319 
2012 2,240 433 637 46 465 30 828 2 43 7 4,524 22 465 
2013 8,329 2,505 3,032 599 1,798 45 3,003 97 802 61 19,571 47 1,798 
2014 5,614 5,484 3,282 476 1,116 83 2,804 22 438 28 18,842 100 1,116 
2015 6,801 2,752 2,658 334 1,554 48 3,077 28 206 34 17,258 78 1,554 
2016 8,001 525,020 3,449 235 1,833 81 4,873 43 154 14 543,703 79 1,974 
2017 4,343 3,316 3,582 534 935 49 2,780 13 99 9 15,660 72 1,017 
2018 3,900 3,296 2,582 229 0 74 2,660 34 404 31 13,210 125 1,300 
2019 
(–Jun.) 2,046 719 1,439 194 0 51 1,110 9 36 2 5,606 64 628 
Total 42,939 544,026 21,674 2,680 8,052 470 22,088 250 2,220 211 642,810 612 10,203 
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4.2. Data Categories and Statistics 
We observed that the data collected from the reports and the malware analysis information 
are related to common cyber campaigns or threat actors, which can be categorized as shown 
in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Data categories of the dataset 
 
The characteristics of each category are as follows. 
① Data that can only be extracted by the parser belong in this category. The quality and 
quantity of this type of data depend highly on the contents of the reports and the 
functionality of the parser. 
② Malware analysis data contained in reports but unable to be extracted by the parser 
belong in this category. The volume of this type of data shows how much malware 
analysis data can compensate for the limitation of the parser. In addition, the indicator 
of this category can be used to compare the quality of the analysis results from several 
malware repositories. 
③ This category includes the data extracted by the parser as well as by the malware 
analysis results. 
④ Some data related to campaigns or threat actors can be excluded in the APT reports 
owing to the low priority compared to other information, or the analysis limitations of 
the authors. Such data found from malware analysis results belong to this category. 
⑤ Noise data generated by the parser belong to this category. The functional limitation 
of the parser increases the portion of data in this category. 
⑥ Data in this category are the noise generated from malware analysis information. It is 
difficult to distinguish between ④ and ⑥, but meaningless data generated by the 
runtime environment of malware belong to this category. 
⑦ There are numerous data in the reports that are difficult for the parser or malware 
analysis information to obtain. Specifically, nontechnical information such as actors 
and groups of cyber campaigns mainly reside in this category. These data need to be 
extracted manually or by other supplemental methods. 
⑧ This category is similar to ⑦ in the sense that neither data extraction methods can 
discover data in this category. Publishers can intentionally exclude the data, or may 
not even know about them. The volume of this category can be minimized by 
comparing several reports related to the same campaigns or threat actors, or by 
gathering multi-source information such as HUMINT and SIGINT. 
 
B. The data contained in the APT report
①
②③ ④ ⑥
A. The CTI for related campaigns (or threat actors)
⑤
C. The data extracted
by the parser
D. The data collected 
from malware analysis result
⑧
⑦
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The statistical features of these dataset categories generated through phase 3 of the system are 
listed in Table 3. It is worth noting that 43% of the data come from malware analysis results (
② and ④) and 26% are newly discovered data that are not contained in the reports (④). 
Comparing that the vast amount of data types in ② with the hash values, ④ consists of 
various types of data including code signs, IP addresses, and other string information 
valuable to identifying an incident. 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of data in each category 
Category ①	 ②	 ③	 ④	
% 46 17 11 26 
 
5 Dataset Application 
As mentioned previously, the objective of generating our dataset is to promote academic 
research related to CTI analysis. We propose three research topics applying a dataset and 
demonstrate one dataset application example in this section. Although it would be better if a 
novel analysis technique could be proposed, this is outside the scope of the present paper. 
The provided application example is the automatically generated correlation analysis results 
of the dataset using MISP. 
5.1. Noise Removal 
As described in section 4, the dataset includes several types of noise, which makes a further 
data analysis difficult and causes erroneous results. The dataset contains noises owing to the 
malfunctions of the data extraction methods and the inclusion of less meaningful data. An 
effective noise removal technique should be able to consider the contextual necessities of the 
data among the entire dataset or sets of events. For example, the data contained in several sets 
of related events where there is little similarity of each event set is considered noise with a 
high probability because it increases the dissimilarity of the event sets correlated with the 
data. 
5.2. Correlation Analysis 
A proper usability of the dataset comes from finding the underlying relations among the data. 
Without any correlations, the dataset itself is nothing but a significant amount of scattered 
data that can only be used to search for the existence of certain items.  
 
Because an event in the dataset is composed of several threat data, the correlations between 
events are determined by analyzing the relations among the threat data consisting of such 
events. A string-matching based method provided by many commercial cyber intelligence 
services would be one way to find the relations of events. However, this simple method has 
several limitations. If two events contain attacker names such as “Bart Simpson” and “B. 
Simpson”, a simple string-matching based method will not find the relations between the 
events. Similarly, if the events include the URLs, “bartsimpson.com” and “bsimpson.net”, the 
relations will also not be discovered. A string-similarity analysis and heuristics can be 
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adopted to overcome such a limitation. Moreover, probabilistic approaches can improve an 
event-wise analysis when considering the relations among sets of data of the events. 
5.3. Temporal Analysis 
Understanding the history of cyber campaigns by adversaries is crucial, not only to defend 
against current incidents and presume the underlying intent, but also to draw the direction of 
adversarial activities from the big picture. Furthermore, the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures identified from the campaigns through a temporal analysis can be used to 
characterize the behavior of the adversarial groups. Therefore, the characteristics can be 
applied as a feature for a correlation analysis of the sequences of events. 
5.4. Example Dataset Application  
The proposed dataset can be used for a correlation analysis of cyber incidences. The cyber 
threat actor group retrieving the correlation in the example is the Lazarus group, which has 
been suspected to have conducted many major cyber campaigns, including the following: 
 
• The Sony Pictures Entertainment attack (2014) 
• A bank heist including the Bangladesh Bank (2016) 
• The worldwide WannaCry ransomware distribution (2017) 
 
We conducted a correlation analysis of a dataset collected by CTIMiner with help from the 
MISP correlation graph shown in Figure 10. 
 
The starting point of the correlation analysis is a security report on “Lazarus’ False Flag 
Malware [31]”, marked as . As mentioned in the report, the Lazarus group was involved in 
a polish banks heist, the corresponding report of which is [32] marked as . The data-wise 
correlation of incidents can be found in Figure 10. The data in ①, which are extracted from 
the reports and from malware analysis results, correlate  and , and the others in ② link 



①
②
Figure 10: Sample application of the dataset to a correlation analysis 
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 to , which is another report from BAE systems regarding the Lazarus group. Therefore, 
through , , and  may have a correlation. 
 
Although this paper does not intend to propose CTI analysis techniques, by applying a 
previously proposed dataset application, we can deduce practical lessons on how this dataset 
can be used for CTI generation in this example. A CTI analysis algorithm is basically able to 
find the connectivity of the data extracted from the same APT report. In advance, the 
algorithm can correlate the reports that analyze the same attributes and campaigns. A CTI 
analysis algorithm should eventually aim to generate actionable intelligence allowing patterns 
of attack to be determined as a means to predicting the intent of the attackers and to prepare 
against similar attacks. 
 
Kim et al. proposed an event-centric correlation analysis approach to assist in generating such 
CTI. They suggested a novel concept and a construction algorithm that expresses the 
similarities among threat events and temporal characteristics in a graphical structure [12]. To 
use our CTI dataset for an advanced analysis, successive studies should be conducted. 
6. Source code and Dataset Access 
The source codes of the CTIMiner system and the generated dataset described in this paper 
are available to the public at our GitHub repository4. Using the source codes, security reports, 
and MISP, a dataset composed of the data types of interest can be generated. 
7. Conclusion 
Owing to the prevalence of cyber threats and a rapid increase in the amount of data collected, 
researchers are developing techniques for the different intelligence processes to be actively 
conducted. However, compared to other intelligence processing steps, studies have been 
undertaken limitedly for the analysis and production step that requires the real CTI dataset for 
the analysis. We pointed out that dataset unavailability is the main reason suppressing 
vitalization of the research despite many interests. To address the problem, we proposed 
CTIMiner system that generates the dataset consisted of the data contained in security reports 
and supplemented with malware analysis data related to the reports. After categorizing the 
types of data collected from the system, we provided the statistical feature of the dataset. To 
show the usability and applicability of the dataset, we proposed several research topics 
possible to be conducted using the dataset and demonstrated the correlation analysis result for 
an event in the dataset. 
 
Our future research direction is to develop and enhance the proposed analysis technique using 
the dataset on top of the CTI correlation analysis framework [12]. By releasing this dataset to 
the public, we believe it can promote the threat analysis research to generate CTI. 
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